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1  Introduction 
Section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
4 of 2000 (Equality Act) prohibits "hate speech" in the following terms: 
Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or 
communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any 
person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to – 
(a) be hurtful; 
(b) be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c) promote or propagate hatred. 
The proviso reads as follows: 
Provided that bona fide engagement in artistic creativity, academic and scientific 
inquiry, fair and accurate reporting in the public interest or publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice in accordance with section 16 of the 
Constitution, is not precluded by this section. 
Section 10 of the Equality Act is often criticised for unduly extending the scope of so-
called "hate speech" as defined in section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution.1 However, while 
it is true that both sections are concerned with discriminatory expression based on 
group characteristics, and while the expression contemplated by section 16(2)(c) of 
the Constitution indeed falls within the ambit of section 10, a context-sensitive analysis 
of section 10 calls for a different interpretive frame of reference than the right to 
freedom of expression only.  
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1   See Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or Publication of 
Information that Unfairly Discriminates” 93; Teichner 2003 SAJHR 353-357; Currie and De Waal 
Bill of Rights Handbook 378-379; Kok 2001 TSAR 299-300. 
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Section 10 of the Equality Act clearly does not essentially describe, and is not primarily 
aimed at effectively regulating the extreme expression that falls within the narrow 
ambit of section 16(2), in particular section 16(2)(c), of the Constitution. Section 16(2) 
categorically excludes (a) propaganda for war, (b) incitement of imminent violence 
and (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and 
that constitutes incitement to cause harm, from the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression. In effect, therefore, subject to the rule-of-law requirement of a rational 
relationship between legislation and its legitimate purpose, the state may combat the 
aforesaid forms of expression in an unfettered manner.2 These forms of expression 
are clearly regarded as a threat to constitutional democracy. Borrowing from 
Rosenfeld, they can be described as  
... extremist anti-democratic speech, including hate speech advocating denial of 
democratic or constitutional rights to its targets.3  
Section 16(2)(c) in particular contemplates only expression of the most severe and 
deeply felt, group-related contempt that constitutes incitement to harm and imperils 
democracy. Any extension of this ambit should therefore be approached with extreme 
caution to solely serve the specific aims of the exclusion.  
The more directly applicable context within which to interpret section 10 is the 
requirement in terms of sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution to enact legislation 
that would prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination. In satisfying this constitutional 
requirement, section 10 acknowledges the hurt and harm that discriminatory 
expression may cause. It condemns the reinforcement of systemic discrimination by 
means of expression, particularly in the broad societal context. Its primary aim is the 
restorative promotion of equality.  
Against this backdrop, this article analyses section 10(1) in the light of sections 9(3) 
and (4) of the Constitution. By prohibiting unfair discrimination subject to a fairness 
assessment against the constitutional standard, section 6 of the Act in principle covers 
discriminatory expression, including hate speech. This implies that the categorical 
                                        
2   Rautenbach 2001 TSAR 618 fn 3. 
3   Rosenfeld 2002-2003 Cardozo L Rev 1549, with reference to a 18 of the German Basic Law. 
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prohibition of hate speech will comply with sections 9(3) and (4) and, for that matter, 
section 16 of the Constitution only if it strictly covers expression with no reasonable 
prospect of meeting the fairness standard. Put differently, the prohibited expression 
may in no way potentially promote rather than jeopardise the achievement of equality. 
In view of this, the article firstly considers the reason for the separate categorical hate 
speech prohibition.  
A systematic, contextualised and interrelated purposive interpretation of each of the 
terms and phrases of section 10, as well as the forms of expression that the section 
12 proviso excludes from the application of section 10, then follows. The condition 
that the prohibited expression may in no way potentially promote equality is 
considered as a guideline for purposive interpretation. By specifically mentioning 
certain forms of expression, it is argued, the proviso acknowledges the special 
challenges associated with the protection of the freedoms of expression explicitly 
stipulated in section 16(1) of the Constitution.  
Considering the potential risk that a purposive interpretation of section 10(1) may still 
cover expression that does not jeopardise equality, the proposed interpretation is then 
tested against the constitutional fairness standard. The notion that the value of a 
particular form of expression determines the level of constitutional protection it should 
receive, constitutes a significant component of this assessment. This value is 
determined based on the values and interests that are generally acknowledged as 
informing the protection of the right to freedom of expression. The assessment 
ultimately leads to the conclusion that a purposive interpretation of section 10 covers 
only low-value expression that unfairly discriminates and that has no potential of 
promoting equality in any context.  
Finally, the justification of the limitation of the right to freedom of expression in terms 
of section 36 of the Constitution is addressed. In the light of the outcome of the 
fairness assessment, and assuming that unfair discrimination cannot be justified, the 
impact of the prohibition of hate speech on the right to freedom of expression clearly 
does not carry substantial weight compared to the compelling purpose of the 
limitation. That leaves for consideration the means by which section 10 achieves its 
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aims. As lenient restorative means are used to enforce compliance, it is concluded that 
the section 10 limitation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression is justified 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
Frequent reference is made to legislation, case law and related academic views in 
foreign jurisdictions, especially the United States, Canada and Germany, as well as 
international law. Although this is not a comparative study, the South African 
Constitutional Court has recognised some perspectives relating to these foreign 
jurisdictions' approaches in regulating expression in general, and expression that can 
be described as "hate speech" in particular. In this regard, the article takes into 
account the difference in the approach to freedom of speech in American 
jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of Canada, Germany and South Africa. Whilst the 
American approach is individualistic, the other jurisdictions follow a more 
"communitarian approach … which seeks to balance freedom of expression with other 
values, such as multi-culturism, equality and dignity".4  
2  The constitutional aims of section 10(1) 
Subsections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution require the state to enact national 
legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. As stated in its preamble, the 
Equality Act approaches this requirement with a focus on  
... systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination (that still) remain deeply embedded 
in social structures, practices and attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our 
constitutional democracy.  
It endeavours to 
... facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its diversity, marked by 
human relations that are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of 
equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human dignity and freedom.  
It is in this light that the different aspects of section 10(1) will be interpreted. 
                                        
4  Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-78 - 42-79. Case v Minister of Safety and 
Security, Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) paras 29-35. 
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Section 6 of the Act prohibits unfair discrimination, subject to a fairness assessment 
in terms of section 14. The question therefore arises as to why it was necessary to 
enact a categorical hate speech prohibition instead of merely pursuing hate speech 
claims under section 6.5 The answer lies in the reality that a categorical provision 
undoubtedly has a better chance of effectively achieving the reformative societal 
goals, particularly the preventative goals, required by the Constitution than a case-by-
case development that is complaints-driven, retrospective and requires evidence of 
the detrimental effects of an incident.6 According to the Act, a complainant of unfair 
discrimination bears the onus to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.7 In 
terms of section 1, disadvantage, whether direct or indirect, is a definitive element of 
discrimination. Section 10 is primarily concerned with disadvantage in the form of the 
reinforcement or promotion of inequality in society when expression as described in 
the provision is tolerated. Expecting a complainant to prove that a specific incident 
relates to the broader effect of hate speech on society will be an overwhelming 
evidential burden. This challenge is, however, removed by the categorical recognition 
that the prohibited expression does constitute unfair discrimination. In this provision, 
therefore, those who are marginalised and deprived of self-confidence due to systemic 
humiliation based on their group identity find assurance that they do have a claim.8 
In addition, it assists in sensitising South Africans to the dignity-impairing 
consequences of discriminatory utterances. Noteworthy in this regard is that the 
remedies provided by the Act include the facilitation of empathy, which can lead to an 
apology and to forgiveness and healing.9 In the final instance, section 10 
acknowledges and, to some extent, gives effect to international commitments to 
prohibit hate speech, in particular the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).10 
                                        
5  Kok 2008 Stell LR 128. 
6  Kok 2008 Stell LR 128. 
7  S 13(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the 
Equality Act). 
8  Kok 2008 Stell LR 130-131. 
9  There are a number of forums that make provision for mediation processes to which a presiding 
officer of the Equality Court may refer a matter. These include the Human Rights Commission and 
the Commission on Gender Equality. See s 20(3)(a) of the Equality Act. 
10  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). 
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3  A contextual analysis of section 10(1), read with the proviso in terms 
of section 12 
Section 10(1) and the proviso in section 12 are interrelated and have to be interpreted 
as such. This analysis will show that, when read together, they describe a very 
particular form of expression that essentially does not constitute bona fide 
engagement in any of the forms of expression protected in terms of section 16(1) of 
the Constitution.  
3.1  Section 10(1) 
In the following paragraphs, the different terms and phrases used in section 10(1) will 
be considered, followed by those of the proviso. 
3.1.1  "no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words" 
The term "words" should be understood as, or replaced with, "expression" or 
"expressive content". This is because a textual interpretation results in the paradox 
that the prohibition covers only certain forms of extreme hate speech that fall within 
the ambit of section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution, while fully covering less extreme 
hate speech that falls outside the ambit of section 16(2)(c).11 Such an interpretation 
would be contrary to the stated purpose of the Act, to prohibit expression 
contemplated in section 16(2)(c).12 This approach is further supported by the fact that 
"speech" in the context of "hate speech" is generally accepted to include symbolic 
expression also. Even the American Supreme Court prohibited the burning of the 
American flag under the First Amendment, which explicitly protects "speech".13  
The term "words" also does not fit comfortably into the contextual construction of this 
phrase. Words can be published and used to advocate or propagate ideas, feelings, 
opinions and knowledge, but cannot be advocated or propagated themselves. Hence, 
the phrase should be purposively interpreted or, if such an interpretation is not viable, 
                                        
11   Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or Publication of 
Information that Unfairly Discriminates” 92. 
12  Section 2(b)(v) of the Equality Act. 
13   See Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989); United States v Eichman 496 US 310 (1990). 
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be amended to convey that no person may publish expressive content that 
propagates, advocates14 or communicates15 ideas or views as further described in the 
section.16  
The restriction of the relevant expressive act to "publish"17 implies that expression in 
private conversation is not included. This is in accordance with the guarantee of the 
right to privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution. In addition, it recognises 
and appropriately responds to the risk that a categorical prohibition of expression in 
private conversation may hamper rather than promote equality. Realistically speaking, 
legislation cannot remove feelings of hatred and detestation from people's hearts, 
homes and personal social environments. These emotions may originate from deep 
psychological hurt relating to personal experiences. It may even have a healing effect 
when people verbalise these feelings in private.  
Hate speech prohibitions in comparable jurisdictions, even those relating to extreme 
forms of such speech, support the protection of privacy. For example, the court in R 
v Keegstra,18 the leading Canadian hate speech case, remarked that the fact that 
section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code does not prohibit views expressed with 
an intention to promote hatred if they are expressed privately, indicated Parliament's 
concern not to invade individuals' privacy.19 In the same vein, in R v Ahenakew,20 
                                        
14   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines "advocate" as "to recommend 
or support (an idea, proposal, etc), especially in public". 
15   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines "communicate" as "1. to impart 
(knowledge) or exchange (thoughts, feelings, or ideas) by speech, writing, gestures, etc. 2. 
(transitive; usually followed by 'to') to allow (a feeling, emotion, etc.) to be sensed (by), willingly 
or unwillingly; transmit (to): the dog communicated his fear to the other animals. 3. (intransitive) 
to have a sympathetic mutual understanding". 
16   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines "idea" as "any content of the 
mind" or as "a thought, image, notion or concept formed by the mind, a plan or intention, a main 
aim, purpose or feature, and an opinion or belief". 
17  Kirkpatrick Bloomsbury Thesaurus defines "publication" as "publishing, dissemination, circulation, 
ventilation, divulgence (or divulgency), divulgation, disclosure, promulgation, broadcasting, public-
address system, … spreading the word, spreading abroad, broadcast, announcement, declaration, 
proclamation, pronouncement, public notice, speech, statement, sermon, notification, official 
notice, report, communiqué, bulletin, manifesto, pronunciamento, edict, decree, encyclical, ukase, 
ban, unconfirmed report, rumour, hearsay, gossip". 
18  R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
19   R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 para VII D (iii)(a); Criminal Code (RsC, 1985, c C-46). 
20   R v Ahenakew 2006 SKQB 110. The case concerned an individual who expressed allegedly hateful 
statements to a reporter during an interview. 
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"conversation" in terms of section 319(2) was interpreted as "a conversation not open 
to, or intended for, the public". It was held that the number of persons present is 
irrelevant in determining whether or not a conversation is private.21 Similarly, the 
setting should not be regarded as the determining factor either, as public conversation 
too can occur in private settings. The obvious reasoning is that a meeting, for instance 
at a private residence of one of the attendees, may involve the planning and initiation 
of a process to promote hatred in society, or may be the forum for incitement to 
disturb the public peace, and should thus not be protected based on its private setting. 
In R v Noble22 and R v Elms,23 the principle was laid down that it is not about "whether 
the statement is communicated in a setting that is private", but rather whether it is 
conveyed "other than in private conversation".24 
It then follows that the sharing in private, amongst friends or between a husband and 
wife, of discriminatory feelings of hatred or of feelings of detestation towards others 
based on their group identity does not fall under section 10. On the other hand, a 
discussion by a group of people who plan to harass their homosexual neighbours 
would certainly be the business of society and the state, and would not qualify as a 
private conversation, even if the meeting is closed and takes place at the private home 
of one of the attendees. 
Lastly, it is noted that even though the term "communicate" encompasses the terms 
"propagate" and "advocate", the latter two terms have been explicitly included. This 
may be explained with reference to the aims of the Act25 to give effect to article 4 of 
the ICERD and section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution respectively, which are specifically 
concerned with racist "propaganda" and the "advocacy" of hatred. 
  
                                        
21   R v Ahenakew 2006 SKQB 17-18. See also R v Bahr 2006 ABPC 360 para 30. 
22   R v Noble 2008 BCSC 215. 
23   R v Elms 2006 CanLII 31446 (ON CA). 
24   R v Elms 2006 CanLII 31446 (ON CA) paras 12-13; R v Noble 2008 BCSC 215 para 12-19. 
25  In terms of subss 2(b)(v) and 2(h). 
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3.1.2  "against any person"  
The reason why expression under section 10 must be aimed "against" someone is that 
the prohibition is not concerned with the bona fide communication of information or 
viewpoints, but with expression used as a tool to hurt or harm people directly or 
indirectly by violating their human dignity, or to incite others to do so. This point will 
be argued in more detail later. 
3.1.3  "(a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate 
hatred" 
Section 10 is concerned with both the hurt suffered by the members of a protected 
group, and the harm caused by the spreading of hateful views and the instilling of 
hateful attitudes in respect of certain groups in society.26 Its primary purpose is not to 
use means such as criminal sanctions to protect society against hateful utterances that 
incite audiences to harm others. Rather, it firstly aims to enhance empathy and 
facilitate healing in line with the commitment contained in the preamble to the 
Constitution. It also recognises that inequality may be promoted by different means 
of expression, some of which may not constitute incitement or may not be as extreme. 
Langton uses the example where a copy of Der Stürmer featuring the "Holy Hate" is 
deliberately left where a Jewish colleague will find it, to illustrate how propaganda that 
advocates or incites hatred can be used as an "assault" on an individual based on his 
or her group membership.27 An example of the potential effect of less extreme 
discriminatory speech is the effective reinforcement of unfair gender discrimination, 
such as through the consistent use of patriarchal innuendos disguised as affection.  
Milo and colleagues argue that the harms contemplated by the term "hurtful" in 
particular are open to such wide interpretation that expression in the form of robust 
opinions on racial issues or gender-insensitive jokes may also be prohibited.28 This 
concern will be addressed in the discussion of the bona fide qualification in the proviso.  
                                        
26   Moon 2008-2009 Fla St U L Rev 79. 
27   Langton "Beyond Belief" 77. 
28   Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-87. The decisions of the BCTSA in Marais v 
Jacaranda 94.2FM 40/A/2012 (BCTSA), and the CBSC in SRC re Bye Bye 08/09-0620/2008 (CBSC) 
are noteworthy in this regard. 
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3.1.4  "that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to" 
The reasonableness standard is similar to the standard applied in the law of 
defamation. In this regard, the court in Delange v Costa29 stated that the test is 
objective and requires the conduct concerned 
... to be tested against the prevailing norms of society, that is, the current values and 
thinking of the community.30  
The Constitutional Court interprets these norms of society to be informed by the values 
of the Constitution.31  
In addition, defamation law judgments have shown that the natural and ordinary 
meaning of words have to be considered. In determining the meaning of words, the 
court must take into account not only what the words expressly say, but also what 
they imply.32 Where persons with knowledge of special circumstances attribute an 
innuendo or secondary defamatory meaning to a publication, such meaning is 
relevant.33 In Afri-Forum v Malema, for example, the court endorsed the approach 
taken in defamation law cases and pointed out that words can have different meanings 
to different people.34  
While the above findings in defamation law disputes are relevant in hate speech 
matters, it is crucial also to consider the different objectives of the respective inquiries. 
In the case of defamatory speech, the focus is on compensation for actual damage to 
reputation, specifically in relation to the addressees' interpretation of the speech 
concerned.35 On the other hand, the issue at stake in section 10(1) is the speaker's 
intention as reflected by his or her expressive conduct. Therefore, not only does 
                                        
29   Delange v Costa 1989 2 All SA 267 (A). 
30   Delange v Costa 1989 2 All SA 267 (A) para 16-17. 
31   Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 43. 
32  Sindani v Van Der Merwe 2002 1 All SA 311 (A) para 11; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v 
Esselen's Estate 1994 2 SA 1 (A) 20E-21B. 
33   Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression 94-95 paras 1-4, 9-17; Sindani v Van Der 
Merwe 2002 1 All SA 311 (A) para 9; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2004 3 All SA 511 
(SCA) paras 25-26; Mohamed v Jassiem 1996 1 SA 673 (A) 702; Milo Defamation and Freedom of 
Speech 18. 
34  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) paras 41, 99. 
35  Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2004 3 All SA 511 (SCA) para 98; Milo Defamation and 
Freedom of Speech 35-37, 78; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 48. 
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reasonable audience members' interpretation need to be considered, but also the 
reasonable speaker's.36  
The above approach to the understanding of the meaning of words should equally be 
applied to interpret what the speaker could have reasonably intended to communicate. 
Silencing prima facie discriminatory expression solely because a particular audience 
may reasonably understand it as demonstrating a certain intention may create a 
chilling effect, smothering opportunities to expose stereotypes and thereby 
jeopardising the promotion of equality. The requirement of a "clear" intention points 
to an element of deference to the speaker, as well as caution not to prohibit seemingly 
discriminatory expression that may in fact serve to promote rather than jeopardise 
equality. Significantly, though, the Constitution endorses a substantive understanding 
of the right to human dignity, which also includes the right to be respected by others.37 
This entails that every citizen may be expected to display a reasonable level of societal 
consciousness and empathy as far as the effect of discriminatory expression on others 
is concerned. 
3.2  The proviso 
The focus now shifts to a discussion of the terms of the proviso,38 which will show that 
the proviso ensures that certain forms of expression, or engagement in expression, 
are indeed permitted.39  
3.2.1 "provided that … is not precluded by this section" 
Similar to the relationship between subsections 16(1) and (2) of the Constitution,40 
the proviso serves as an internal modifier of section 10. It explicitly states that the 
forms of expression it describes fall outside the scope of the prohibition. Those relying 
on section 10 will therefore have to establish that their claims fall within its ambit, 
                                        
36  It seems that the court in Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) followed the former approach. 
See paras 93, 103 and 109.  
37   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). See 
Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 5; Woolman "Dignity" 35-8 - 35-10. 
38  The proviso was quoted in the first para of the article. 
39  Bronstein 2006 http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_document.pdf 26. 
40  Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-30. 
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including, where prima facie applicable, that the expression concerned is not excluded 
by the proviso.  
 3.2.2 "in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution" 
According to Bronstein, this section qualifies the phrase "publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice" only.41 However, interpreting the phrase as 
qualifying engagement in every form of expression mentioned in the proviso seems 
more correct, as the following discussion of the contextual sense and significance of 
the phrase will show. 
The phrase firstly underscores that expression within the ambit of section 16(2) of the 
Constitution falls outside the scope of the proviso. It also supports the approach that 
a link should be made between the forms of expression mentioned in the proviso and 
the types of free expression listed in section 16(1).42 By expressly listing the relevant 
categories, it is acknowledged that the protection of these particular freedoms calls 
for special consideration in the context of both section 16(1) and section 10.43 This 
interpretation does not require that a specific form of expression stipulated in the 
proviso should necessarily be related to a specific freedom stipulated in section 16(1). 
Therefore, while engagement in "fair and accurate reporting in the public interest" 
obviously concerns "freedom of the press and other media", all the other forms of 
expression stipulated in the proviso can also function in, and be linked to, the media 
context. Subject to the bona fide qualification and the extent of the freedom guarantee 
in terms of section 16(1), the proviso thus excludes from section 10 engagement in 
any form of expression listed in the proviso.  
  
                                        
41  Bronstein 2006 http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_document.pdf 25. 
See also Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or Publication 
of Information that Unfairly Discriminates” 101. 
42  See Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or Publication of 
Information that Unfairly Discriminates” 93. 
 S 16(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, 
which includes: a) freedom of the press and other media; b) freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas; c) freedom of artistic creativity; and d) academic freedom and freedom of 
scientific research.  
43   Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-57; Tănăsescu RJCL 25-26.  
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3.2.3  "bona fide engagement in" 
Black's Law Dictionary defines bona fide as "made in good faith, without fraud or 
deceit, sincere, genuine".44 Sealy believes that, in the context of corporate decisions, 
"in good faith" is more often used in the sense of "honestly, with the best of 
intentions". In a more objective sense, a bona fide act, activity or state of affairs may 
be described as "genuine". For example, a shareholder's resolution can be described 
as a bona fide expression of corporate opinion if it has not been distorted by some 
irregularity, such as the manipulation of votes or the bribery, intimidation or improper 
bias of some of the members.45 A decision by a corporate organ is normally disputed 
only by impugning the integrity or regularity of the decision-making process and not 
the reasonableness of the result. However, a result may be so unreasonable that it 
leads the court to infer that it has not been reached through a proper process. In this 
way, an element of objectivity may be introduced into an inquiry that is determined 
by subjective considerations.46 In view of this, it is suggested that the bona fide 
requirement in the proviso should be interpreted to include a subjective conviction 
that the expressive act or activity concerned will achieve its intrinsic purpose. The act 
or activity should also maintain the character of the form of expression used. Both 
these issues should be objectively assessed in terms of the reasonableness standard 
described above.  
Of course, establishing intention in terms of section 10(1) and determining bona fide 
engagement in terms of the proviso are two sides of the same coin. A finding in terms 
of section 10(1) that discriminatory expression cannot reasonably be understood as 
demonstrating the required intention implies that it constitutes bona fide engagement 
in constitutionally protected expression, and vice versa.  
The bona fide condition should be interpreted as qualifying engagement in all the 
relevant forms of expression. Bronstein agrees, although with the exception of the 
"publication of any information, advertisement or notice".47 In the light of the relation 
                                        
44   Brown Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 215; Waite et al Concise Oxford Thesaurus 91. 
45   Sealy 1989 Mon LR 269.  
46  Sealy 1989 Mon LR 269. 
47  Bronstein 2006 http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_document.pdf 25. 
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between the proviso and section 16(1) of the Constitution, this exception is not 
supported. The significant effect of the phrase when read as a condition applicable to 
each of the different forms of expression, particularly the "publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice", will be illustrated in the following sections.  
3.2.4  "publication of any information, advertisement or notice" 
The term "publication" implies that the proviso does not exclude engagement in 
private conversation from the ambit of section 10. This complements the view 
expressed above, namely that section 10 is not concerned with conversation in private. 
After all, it would be illogical to exclude engagement in the bona fide communication 
of information in public, while prohibiting the very same communication in private.  
"Information" is defined as  
... knowledge gained or given, facts, news and the communicating or receiving of 
knowledge48  
and as  
... particulars, facts, figures, statistics, data, knowledge, intelligence, instruction, 
advice, guidance, direction, counsel, enlightenment and news.49  
To "inform someone about or of something" means "to give them knowledge or 
information about it" or "to tell them about it".50 "Knowledge" can be defined as 
including "understanding".51  
A noteworthy observation in this regard is that the right to inform includes the right 
to "offend, shock or disturb".52 Free expression is also generally understood to include 
the dissemination of incorrect information or of an understanding or view that is based 
on a misconception. In this regard, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) in General Comment 34 on the ICCPR reiterates that the ICCPR does not 
                                        
48   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary. 
49   Waite et al Concise Oxford Thesaurus. 
50   Waite et al Concise Oxford Thesaurus. 
51   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary. 
52   De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 
para 49. Also see Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-34. 
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permit general prohibitions on expression of historical views, nor does it prohibit a 
person's entitlement to be wrong or to interpret past events incorrectly.53 The German 
Federal Constitutional Court also held that the protection of opinion extends to  
... the subjective attitude and personal judgment of the person expressing himself 
with regard to the object of the statement [independently] of whether the statement 
is rational or emotional, well founded or groundless, or regarded by others as useful 
or harmful, valuable or valueless.  
Generally, both the terms "information" and "ideas" are included in other, comparable 
hate speech formulations.54 Therefore, the question arises whether the absence of the 
latter term in the Equality Act proviso affects the meaning of the phrase and, if so, to 
what extent. 
The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines an idea as "a thought, image, notion 
or concept formed by the mind". In order for an idea to become the subject of 
adjudication, it needs to materialise in some discernible form. A distinction can be 
made between the manifestation of an idea through the dissemination or 
communication of information about or inspired by it, and the manifestation of an idea 
through an onslaught based on group identity. The section 10 prohibition is concerned 
with the latter. For example, if someone were to express the bona fide view that 
homosexuality is a psychological condition that can and should be cured, the 
expression would not fall within the ambit of section 10, although, in a specific context 
and subject to a section 14 analysis, it may conceivably be said to constitute unfair 
discrimination. In contrast, the expression of hatred, scorn or derision against 
homosexual people not with the aim of being "primarily informational, but [as an] 
instrumental means of keeping others down" is not excluded in terms of the proviso.55 
In this regard, Delgado and Stefancic point out that so-called "demeaning remarks" 
cannot readily be improved by further communication. Consider for example a racist 
                                        
53   ICCPR General Comment 34 - Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (2011) 14. 
54   See, for example, a 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); a 19 of the ICCPR; 
and a 10(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950). 
55   Delgado and Stefancic 1996 U Colo L Rev 104. See also Wright 2000-2001 Chi-Kent L Rev 999. 
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insult. The statement "Nigger, go back to Africa, you don't belong on this campus" 
conveys little information and invites no meaningful response.56  
A further example can be found in the matter of Visser, Thomson and Others v 94.7 
Highveld Stereo,57 which was heard by the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of 
South Africa (BCCSA). During a broadcast on Highveld Stereo on 11 April 2012, the 
presenters had an exchange about the Miss Universe pageant. One of the contestants, 
a certain Jenna, had been born a man, but became a woman after undergoing gender 
reassignment surgery. The presenters went on to make the following comments: 
About the Miss Universe competition … now allows transgender … Jenna was a man 
is now a woman. Has changed her name. She still has some parts down there. Extra 
parts girls don't have … They first were upset and they took her out of the competition 
and now … they have decided to let her back in … Did she have to disclose her extra 
bits or did someone see them? … You can't hide that. She hid it in the beginning … 
And then she was hey guys guess what? … She is beautiful … She looks like a woman. 
There isn't a committee that checks out everyone's nether regions … They believe 
you are a woman. They believe they have already been checked … She could even 
win. Balls to the wall. Good luck to "It".58 
These remarks were undeniably discriminatory and crude, and invaded the core 
privacy of the target. In addition, these negative effects were enhanced by having 
been published in the form of a radio broadcast. At least some of the remarks appear 
to have been primarily aimed at hurting and harming Jenna based on her group 
identity, rather than offering an opinion on the Miss Universe pageant's approach to 
transgender contestants. Clearly, the derogatory remarks were not necessary to 
effectively communicate an opinion in this regard. All these aspects contradict the 
essential characteristics of bona fide comment, opinion or even humour, and lead one 
to conclude that the intention required in terms of section 10 can be reasonably 
construed.  
  
                                        
56   Delgado and Stefancic 1996 U Colo L Rev 104-105; R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 para VI. 
57   Visser, Thomson and Others v 94.7 Highveld Stereo 27/2012 (BCTSA). 
58   Visser, Thomson and Others v 94.7 Highveld Stereo 27/2012 (BCTSA) para 1. 
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3.2.5  "artistic creativity"  
Over the years, numerous attempts have been made to define art. One such definition 
describes "art speech" as 
... the autonomous use of the artist's creative process to make and fashion form, 
color, symbol, image, movement or other communication of meaning that is made 
manifest in a tangible medium.59  
Eberle points out that art does not by nature propagate, constitute incitement, or 
threaten.60 Art depicts the artist's vision, expresses his or her personality, or conveys 
meaning through creative ideas, forms and images.61 Art is generally acknowledged 
as "integral to human culture" and "part of individual and social self-definition".62 It 
frequently addresses themes and issues that are painful to or difficult for society or 
are ignored through social prejudice or routine.63 It also offers "a fuller conception of 
the human person" by providing "a portal" to non-rational, non-cognitive, non-
discursive dimensions of human life. It functions as a private sphere of freedom within 
which  
... a person can contemplate and muse over elements of the human condition free 
from the pressures or sanctions of normal social forces.64  
Humour can be seen as a form of art. As Oring said,  
Some jokes are truly beautiful, and those who create them, reshape them, and orally 
purvey them are often genuine artists.65  
The essential characteristic of bona fide humour is the intention to be funny.66  
Case law reflects these notions. In the Street Theater decision,67 the German Federal 
Constitutional Court concluded that the street performance at issue constituted art 
                                        
59   Farley 2005 Tul L Rev 842-845; The Street Theater decision BVerfGE 67, 213 1 BvR 816/82 (17 
July 1984) para B.1.3(a).  
60   Eberle 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 25. 
61   Eberle 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 7. 
62   Eberle 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 13. 
63   Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-52. 
64   Eberle 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 6; Salzman 1999 Harv CR-CL L Rev 438-439; Mephisto 
decision BVerfGE 30, 173 (24 February 1971) para C. III.5. 
65   As quoted by Little in Little 2011 S Cal Interdisc L J 114 fn 100. 
66   Little in Little 2011 S Cal Interdisc L J 109. 
67   Street Theater decision BVerfGE 67, 213 1 BvR 816/82 (17 July 1984)  
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based on the presence of creative elements, such as the manner in which it was 
performed and the inclusion and interpretation of a famous poem. The special form 
of street theatre also included some distancing from the audience, such as through 
the use of placards, puppets and costumes. Spectators were therefore aware that they 
were witnessing a "play". Finally, the message of the performance remained open to 
various interpretations, despite the organiser's principal and undisputed political 
intentions.68 In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sharpe69 also held 
that artistic merit includes any expression that may reasonably be viewed as art, even 
though an objective party may find it crude or immature.70 Numerous factors play a 
role, including the creator's subjective intention, the form and content of the work, its 
connections with artistic conventions, traditions or styles, subject experts' opinions 
and the mode of production, display and distribution, none of which is conclusive on 
its own.71 
"Artistic creativity" may involve the production, presentation, display or employment 
of art.72 The use of art may affect the interpretation of a communication. However, 
the involvement of art does not automatically render the expression bona fide artistic 
creativity. This is illustrated by the findings in the Strauss Caricature decision. The 
German Constitutional Court had to consider whether drawings portraying the 
Bavarian Minister-President Franz Josef Strauss as a pig engaged in sexual activity 
constituted criminal defamation. The court was satisfied that the drawings represented 
art in terms of the fundamental right guaranteed by the first sentence of article 5(3) 
of the Basic Law.73 This finding was based on the observation that the drawings were 
the result of free creative action through which the creator directly displayed his 
impressions, observations and experiences.74 Having acknowledged that the message 
                                        
68   Street Theater decision BVerfGE 67, 213 1 BvR 816/82 (17 July 1984 B.1.3(a); Salzman 1999 Harv 
CR-CL L Rev 445-452.  
69   R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45 para 5. 
70   Publications Control Board v Gallo (Africa) Ltd 1975 3 SA 665 (AD). 
71   R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45 para 61-67. 
72   Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-52. See Tănăsescu 2011 RJCL 12-21 for an 
evaluation of the effect of legal documents explicitly protecting artistic freedom as an object of the 
protection of freedom of expression, and those that do not. Also see the Mephisto decision BVerfGE 
30, 173 (24 February 1971) para C. III.1. 
73   Strauss Caricature decision BVerfGE 75, 369 (3 June 1987) para C.I.2. 
74   Strauss Caricature decision BVerfGE 75, 369 (3 June 1987) para C.I.2. Also see Mutzenbacher 
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of the drawings should therefore rather be interpreted as aimed at social commentary 
and not at humiliating an individual, the court concluded that it was nevertheless clear 
that the drawings were intended as an assault on the caricatured person's dignity. The 
aim was to show that he had distinct "bestial" characteristics and behaved accordingly. 
The court held that this deprived him of his dignity as a human being in a way that 
could not be justified by artistic freedom, and that 
... a legal system that takes the dignity of man as the highest value must disapprove 
of.75  
Viewed through the lens of section 10, the argument would be that the "art speech" 
could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to violate human 
dignity and that the drawings did not constitute bona fide engagement in artistic 
creativity.  
A good example in the "hate speech" context is the decision by a major Danish 
newspaper in 2005 to publish a series of controversial cartoons under the headline 
"The Face of Mohammed". The publication caused an international outcry, which was 
soon dubbed the "cartoon wars" or the "cartoon controversy".76 An application for an 
interdict against the publication of the cartoons in the Sunday Times and other 
newspapers was granted in the matter of Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal and Johncom 
Investment.77 The finding was based on the greater weight attached to human dignity 
as opposed to the right to freedom of the press. No mention was made of artistic 
creativity, despite the fact that the cartoonist, Westergaard, defended even the most 
controversial of the cartoons, the depiction of Mohammed with a bomb-shaped turban, 
as being an "incendiary but dignified drawing".78 Commentators argue that the 
offending cartoons themselves were not the real issue. Instead, they were being 
misused by right-wing groups to assert that a Muslim could never be a democrat, as 
                                        
decision BVerfGE 83, 130 1 BvR 402/87 (27 November 1990) para B.I.(a).  
75  Strauss Caricature decision BVerfGE 75, 369 (3 June 1987) para C.I.4(a). 
76   The article drew attention to recent incidents in which authors had engaged in self-censorship to 
avoid provoking Muslims. See Pillay 2010 SALJ 464-466. 
77  Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal and Johncom Investment 2006 ZAGPHC 12 para 10. 
78   Keane 2008 Hum Rts Q 858. 
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well as by Islamists and Muslim extremists to further their aims by alleging that they 
(the cartoons) attacked Islam in order to exacerbate the clash of civilisations.79  
In contrast, in response to a complaint that the cartoonist Shapiro defamed South 
African president Jacob Zuma, or violated his right to dignity, the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) held that the cartoonist had engaged in artistic creativity. 
The cartoon depicted Mr Zuma with his pants undone, apparently preparing to rape a 
blindfolded "Lady Justice", who was being held down by the secretary-general of the 
African National Congress (ANC), the ANC Youth League president, the South African 
Communist Party general secretary and the general secretary of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU). Lady Justice was wearing a sash displaying the words 
"Justice System". A speech bubble showed the ANC secretary-general urging Zuma: 
"Go for it, boss!" The SAHRC reasoned that it was common knowledge that Zuma's 
allies in the tripartite alliance were calling for a "political solution" to the corruption 
charges he was facing at the time. The cartoonist acted with "bona fide artistic 
creativity, in the public interest", the SAHRC found, and his cartoon did not 
discriminate against Zuma, women or rape victims, as some claimed, but was "satirical 
and metaphorical". In addition, the cartoon was seen as  
 ... a political expression, published in the public interest and, as such, deserved heightened 
protection.80 
Recently, the display and eventual removal by the Goodman Art Gallery of a painting 
titled The Spear, depicting Mr Zuma in the posture of Vladimir Lenin on a famous 
poster, but with his genitals exposed, elicited a heated debate on the constitutionality 
of the painting and, thus, its display in the gallery.81 The painting certainly had the 
essential characteristics of art, and its display in an art gallery constituted artistic 
creativity. It was generally acknowledged that the artistic nature of the painting had 
a bearing on the interpretation of the core statement it most probably made. Rather 
                                        
79   Isenson 2006 http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1891671_page_0,00.html; Rosenfeld "Hate Speech 
in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis" 280. 
80   Manamela, Buti v Shapiro GP/2008/1037/E (SAHRC) 2008 para 5. 
81   See Barnard-Naudé and De Vos 2012 LitNet Akademies 176-201.  
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than being aimed at the personal humiliation of Zuma, it commented on Zuma's 
conduct and views as a political leader. 
A final example in this regard is the matter of Afri-Forum v Malema, where it was 
argued on the ANC's behalf that  
... [s]ong is a form of verbal art which people use both for emotional release and also 
for manipulation of others.82  
While this may be true, engagement in the singing of a song does not necessarily 
constitute bona fide artistic creativity. Considering the extreme lyrics of the song in 
question, "Kill the Farmer, Kill the Boer", combined with the fact that those who 
engaged in singing it knew that many members of the audience did not have the 
frame of reference to perceive it as a freedom song, the primary objective was clearly 
to spread and promote a message of hatred rather than to serve any of the typical 
aims of art. 
3.2.6  "academic and scientific inquiry" 
Freedom of expression is a "key component" of the individual's right to conduct and 
publish research and to disseminate knowledge through teaching without government 
interference.83 Research has been described as "a serious and systematic attempt in 
terms of content and form to find the truth" and includes all research-related activities, 
such as the dissemination of results through publication.84  
(A)cademic freedom unlocks our intellectual potential to serve humanity with ever-
increasing understanding and skill. Academics are thus in the service of society and 
may be held accountable by society.85  
Examples of discriminatory academic views on historical events that have been 
categorically restricted include the so-called Holocaust denial and expression of 
support for Nazi ideology based on a combination of scientific ideas. These ideas 
include Darwinism, which contends that to survive, a superior race must not only 
                                        
82  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 54. 
83  Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 370. 
84  Alston and Malherbe 2009 TSAR 105. 
85  Alston and Malherbe 2009 TSAR 104. 
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separate itself from lesser ones, but also continue to suppress and dominate those 
who threaten to overtake it.86  
Context plays an important part in establishing the boundaries of acceptable and non-
acceptable academic expression. Alston and Malherbe point out that an educational 
environment that confines educators, for example by prescribing single textbooks and 
requiring syllabus conformity that excludes contentious issues, not only prevents 
teachers from sharing their views or introducing controversial subjects, but also, and 
equally, denies learners the opportunity to fulfil their potential in a world of diverse 
ideas.87 Braun, on the other hand, highlights that the right not to listen is a corollary 
of the right to speak. This choice is denied a  
... captive audience of schoolchildren who could either listen and "learn" or suffer the 
consequences.88  
Where hate speech is concerned, these contextual aspects are relevant in the 
reasonableness assessment to determine the speaker's intention. The publication in 
an academic journal of a scientific article that argues that females are genetically less 
intelligent than males would prima facie constitute bona fide engagement in academic 
and scientific inquiry. However, this may not be the case when the article contains 
sexist remarks that are not essential in substantiating the contention. The presentation 
of the article to a class of schoolgirls, without also presenting other perspectives, may 
also be found to be aimed at the reinforcement of stereotypes that humiliate women, 
rather than to constitute bona fide engagement in scientific inquiry.89  
  
                                        
86  Meinecke Nazi Ideology and the Holocaust 11-13. 
87  Alston and Malherbe 2009 TSAR 111-112. 
88  Braun Democracy off Balance 27. 
89   In this regard, it is noteworthy that two of the leading "hate speech" cases in Canada, R v Keegstra 
[1990] 3 SCR 697 and Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 873-874, 
involved teachers. In Ross, the court noted that "young children are especially vulnerable to the 
messages conveyed by their teachers … [since] they are unlikely to distinguish between falsehood 
and truth and more likely to accept derogatory views espoused by a teacher". See Moon 2008-
2009 Fla St U L Rev 88-91. 
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3.2.7  "fair and accurate reporting in the public interest"  
The phrase "fair and accurate reporting90 in the public interest" is reminiscent of the 
American common law privilege known as the "fair report" or "record" privilege. This 
privilege initially applied to reports of proceedings within its ambit, provided that the 
report constituted an (a) accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of such 
proceedings, and (b) was not made solely to cause harm to the person defamed.91 
Section 611 of the Second Restatement of Torts removed the latter requirement. The 
privilege applies  
... even though the publisher himself does not believe the defamatory words he 
reports to be true and even when he knows them to be false.92  
One could lose the privilege through a  
... showing of fault in failing to do what is reasonably necessary to insure that the 
report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment.93  
The purpose of the "fair and accurate reporting" privilege is to ensure that the public 
interest is served by the dissemination of information about events occurring at official 
proceedings and public meetings.94  
In National Media Limited v Bogoshi, the Supreme Court of Appeal described "matters 
of public interest to the community" as "matters relating to the public life of the 
community and those who take part in it ... but excluding matters which are personal 
and private, such that there is no public interest in their disclosure".95 The matter of 
Jersild v Denmark96 in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) illustrates the 
application of these principles with respect to hate speech. The case dealt with the 
                                        
90   Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines "report" as "to bring back 
(information, etc.) as an answer, news or account; to give a formal or official account or description 
of (findings, information, etc.), especially after an investigation; to give an account of (some matter 
of news, etc.), especially for a newspaper, or TV or radio broadcast; to act as a newspaper, TV or 
radio reporter; to make a complaint about someone, especially to a person in authority; to take 
down or record the details of a legal case, proceedings, etc". 
91   Cox and Callaghan 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 21-46. 
92   Cox and Callaghan 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 35-36. 
93   Cox and Callaghan 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 35. 
94   Cox and Callaghan 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 37. 
95   National Media Limited v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 24.  
96   Jersild v Denmark 15890/89 (1993) (ECHR). 
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conviction in terms of Danish hate speech legislation of a Danish journalist who had 
interviewed several members of an extremist youth group, the Greenjackets, on a 
news programme. In the course of the interview, the Greenjackets made extreme 
racist remarks and were subsequently also convicted. The court confirmed that there 
could be no doubt that the remarks in respect of which the Greenjackets were 
convicted were more than insulting to members of the targeted groups and did not 
enjoy protection under article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.97 However, the conviction of the journalist 
was found to be in violation of article 10. The court held as follows: 
The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made 
by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the 
press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless 
there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.98 
The related term "fair comment" has been purposively interpreted in the media 
context.99 In The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride,100 the Constitutional Court stated 
that the defence of protected or "fair" comment required, at the outset, that the facts 
be "truly stated". A commentator is not protected if he or she "chooses to publish an 
expression of opinion which has no relation, by way of criticism, to any fact before the 
reader".101 The comment or criticism will be protected "even if extreme, unjust, 
unbalanced, exaggerated and prejudiced". However, it has to relate to a matter of 
public interest and must express an honestly held opinion without malice.102 In the 
context of the Equality Act proviso, non-compliance with these conditions will render 
the comment not bona fide. 
                                        
97   A 10(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) protects freedom of expression in the following terms: "Everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprises." 
98   Jersild v Denmark 15890/89 (1993) (ECHR) para 35. 
99   See for example clauses 35 and 12 respectively of the previous and new broadcasting codes of 
the BCCSA 2009 and 2011 http://www.bccsa.co.za/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=915. 
100  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC). 
101  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 88; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 
401 (CC) 401 para 24. 
102  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 83; Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd v Van Der Merwe 2004 4 All SA 365 (SCA) para 84. 
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At this point, it has to be reiterated that while the inclusion of this phrase explicitly 
correlates with the guarantee of media freedom in terms of section 16(1)(a) of the 
Constitution, other forms of expression under the proviso may be similarly related. 
This approach addresses Bronstein's concern that the proviso may be interpreted to 
give narrow protection to the press.103  
The Constitutional Court highlighted the special challenges in relation to the media in 
Khumalo v Holomisa. The court described the media as "primary agents" of the 
dissemination of information and ideas104 and, as such, "extremely powerful 
institutions in a democracy" with a "constitutional duty to act with vigour, courage, 
integrity and responsibility".105 These attributes will have to be considered in all 
instances where engagement in a form of expression mentioned in the proviso occurs 
in the media context. 
4  Does section 10 strictly accomplish its essential aims? 
The potential risk that a categorical prohibition of discriminatory expression, in this 
instance section 10, may jeopardise the promotion of equality by preventing the 
exposure of stereotypes and their condemnation by means of response106 warrants 
consideration. While the general prohibition of unfair discrimination in terms of the 
Equality Act meets the challenge of not prohibiting fair discrimination by requiring a 
case-by-case contextual fairness analysis, section 10 has to achieve this in terms of 
its definitional scope. In order to determine whether this is indeed achieved, the 
provision as interpreted above will now be subjected to a fairness analysis against the 
constitutional fairness standard.107  
Such an analysis requires a balancing of the potential effect of the prohibited 
expression on equality, and the impact of the prohibition on other constitutional rights, 
                                        
103  Bronstein 2006 http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_document.pdf 24. 
104  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 22. See also Print Media South Africa v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2011 ZAGPJHC 149 para 40; Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-TV v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 5 SA 540 (SCA) para 22. 
105  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 24. 
106  See R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 para VII C. (i). 
107  The approach that unfair discrimination cannot be justified in terms of the Constitution is followed. 
See Pretorius 2010 SAJHR 552-553. 
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particularly the right to freedom of expression. Different levels of speech value require 
different standards of protection of the right to freedom of expression.108 The South 
African Constitutional Court endorsed this idea in De Reuck v Director of Public 
Prosecutions when it concluded that the expression at issue was 
... expression of little value which is found on the periphery of the right and is a form 
of expression that is not protected as part of the freedom of expression in many 
democratic societies.109  
The interests and values that are generally acknowledged to underpin the protection 
of the right to freedom of expression are the discovery of truth and the advancement 
of knowledge,110 the establishment and maintenance of "representative 
democracy",111 and human dignity in the sense of personal autonomy in the pursuance 
of self-fulfilment and development.112 If, when assessed against these values and 
interests, the value of the expression covered in terms of section 10 is categorically 
low, the risk that its prohibition will unduly violate the right to freedom of expression 
will be substantially less.  
However, such an assessment has to take into account the tension inherent in the 
respective values and interests involved. For example, freedom of expression may be 
crucial for knowledge, but may in certain circumstances also jeopardise truth and 
                                        
108  RAV v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992) 386; Wright 2000-2001 Chi-Kent L Rev 998-999, 1008; 
Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973) 24, 31; Sullivan and Gunther Constitutional Law 1076-1081. 
109  De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 
para 59. Also see R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 para VII D (i); Auschwitz Lie decision BVerfGE 
90 (13 April 1994) para II 1; Soldiers Are Murderers decision BVerfGE 93, 266 (10 October 1995) 
para III 1-2; Wunsiedel decision BVerfG 1, BvR 2150/08 (4 November 2009) para 71-79; Payandeh 
2010 German L J 929-942; Kommers and Miller Constitutional Jurisprudence 493-497. 
110  Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism 267-268; Chemerinsky Constitutional Law Principles 
955; Mill On Liberty 10, 1; Dworkin Freedom's Law 200; Ducat Constitutional Interpretation775; 
Sullivan and Gunther Constitutional Law 959-960; Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech 56; 
Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 272. 
111  See the discussion of the concept "representative democracy" by Roux "Democracy" 10-11. Also 
see Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 21; National Media Limited v Bogoshi 1998 4 
SA 1196 (SCA) para 24, 42; South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 
SA 469 (CC) para 7; S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para 37; and Islamic Unity Convention 
v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) paras 25-30. 
112  Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech 55-79; Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 272-273. 
Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-14 - 42-30; Burchell Personality Rights 
and Freedom of Expression 1-4, 9-17; Devenish Commentary 189-190; Neisser SAJHR 344-
345; Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism 269. 
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knowledge.113 Freedom of expression may be essential for the maintenance of 
democracy, but may also be instrumental in destroying it.114 Freedom of expression 
may facilitate autonomy and the development of the personality, but may at the same 
time break down these attributes to the extent that it jeopardises freedom and 
equality. Of considerable importance with respect to the value of human dignity is the 
fact that the South African Constitution endorses a substantive concept of human 
dignity, also including respect for and the self-esteem of others. In the words of Sachs 
J, 
The focus on dignity results in emphasis being placed simultaneously on context, 
impact and the point of view of the affected persons.115 
Alexy's "second law of balancing" may also prove useful in the analysis.116 This law, 
as interpreted by Bilchitz, requires only relatively conclusive evidence to be accepted 
as the basis for limiting a constitutional right.117 Therefore, if it is not clear that 
discriminatory expression does or will violate the right to equality, the right to freedom 
of expression should not be categorically limited to protect it. Using the terminology 
of the ICCPR, it should be "necessary" to limit the right to freedom of expression in 
order to protect the right to equality. It follows that any categorical prohibition of "hate 
speech" should cover a narrow ambit where such necessity can be substantiated. 
In this respect, the following must be taken into account:  
The preamble to the Constitution contains a positive commitment to "(h)eal the 
divisions of the past". This perspective on equality requires a societal awareness of 
and an enhanced level of empathy with respect to hurt and suffering relating to group 
identity.118  
                                        
113  Chemerinsky Constitutional Law Principles 956; Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of 
Expression 10-11; Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 42-18 - 42-21; Sullivan and 
Gunther Constitutional Law 960; Weinberg California Law Review 1141-1164; Weinrib 2009 U 
Toronto Fac L Rev 175-176; Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003) 388, 392; Kupenda and Paige 
2009 T Marshall L Rev 70. 
114  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) para 31; Roux 
"Democracy" 10-36; Rosenfeld 2002-2003 Cardozo L Rev 1549; Krotoszynski 2004 Tul L Rev 1590. 
Brugger 2003 German Law Journal 5. 
115  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 
126. 
116  Bilchitz 2010 SA Public Law 433.  
117  Bilchitz 2010 SA Public Law 433. 
118  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 94. 
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The recommended interpretation of section 10 entails that it cover a narrow ambit of 
discriminatory expression that can reasonably be construed as clearly aimed at causing 
hurt or harm based on group characteristics. Explicitly excluded from this ambit is 
bona fide engagement in the constitutionally protected forms of expression stipulated 
in terms of section 16(1) of the Constitution.  
Obviously, the forms of expression contemplated in section 10 may deepen the 
feelings of inferiority and disempowerment experienced by groups and group 
members who have been, or still are, humiliated and disempowered by systemic 
discrimination on any of the relevant grounds. This type of expression may also create 
new stereotypes that intimidate and marginalise based on historical guilt and "rekindle 
the divisions of the past".119 The failure to prohibit it may send out an unfortunate 
message, namely that the legislature and society do not regard vulnerable groups' 
dignity as imperative. As a result, people may experience disrespect, inferiority, 
frustration and marginalisation and may consequently be deprived of the opportunities 
to gain knowledge, participate in the democratic process, develop their personalities 
and be truly free and equal.120  
On the other hand, there is no significant potential risk that section 10 might eliminate 
opportunities to expose stereotypes by means of response. It does not prevent 
speakers from using legitimate forms of expression to bring to light the very views 
and ideas that underlie the desire to utter or display the hateful remarks section 10 
prohibits. As a matter of fact, those who feel so strongly about an issue that they 
experience emotions of hatred and a desire to humiliate those they hate, or to provoke 
such hatred in others, will probably use all the legitimate means at their disposal to 
disseminate these views. The fact is that the respectful presentation of these views is 
much more likely to elicit meaningful response than the expression contemplated by 
section 10. It should be noted that bona fide engagement in expression under the 
proviso may include expression that incidentally hurts or harms, based on group 
characteristics. In addition, the risk that the condemnation of the expression may 
                                        
119  Rautenbach 2007 TSAR 551-560. 
120  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41. 
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enhance hatred and frustration is minimised by the exclusion of private conversation 
and by the provision of appropriate measures and orders in terms of the Act, to 
facilitate reconciliation and empathy.121 
It is therefore concluded that section 10 covers a narrowly defined ambit of low-value 
expression that unfairly promotes inequality in society. It follows that the hate speech 
prohibition gives effect to the obligation in terms of sections 9(3) and (4) of the 
Constitution.  
5  Justification of the limitation of the right to freedom of expression 
In the light of the conclusion above,122 all that remains is to consider the means 
employed to enforce compliance with the prohibition. As lenient restorative remedies 
are provided for, the prohibition of the expression contemplated by section 10 is clearly 
justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
6  Conclusion 
This analysis has shown that the prohibition found in section 10 of the Equality Act is 
not restricted to words, but includes other forms of expression also. It does not apply 
to private conversations. In the reasonableness assessment to determine whether 
discriminatory expression could be understood as demonstrating the required clear 
intention, the reasonable meaning of the expressed content to members of the 
audience as well as to the speaker should be considered. The same objective 
reasonableness assessment applies to the determination of the bona fides provided 
for in the proviso. The condition of bona fide engagement applies to all the forms of 
expression listed in the proviso, which in turn relate to the freedoms mentioned in 
section 16(1) of the Constitution. These observations lead one to conclude that section 
10(1) applies only to engagement in expression that, in terms of an objective 
reasonableness assessment, is clearly primarily aimed at hurting or harming others, 
or at inciting others to hurt or harm, or at promoting hatred based on group identity. 
Bona fide expression in accordance with the essential characteristics of the freedoms 
                                        
121  Sections 21(2) and (3) of the Equality Act. 
122  See Pretorius 2010 SAJHR 552-553. 
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of expression listed in section 16(1) of the Constitution does not constitute the 
intention required by the prohibition.  
 Ultimately, it is suggested that section 10(1) prohibits discriminatory expression that 
will manifestly obstruct the constitutional quest to heal our injured society. It manages 
to achieve this without jeopardising the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression, construed in the light of the foundational values of the Constitution.  
  
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
932 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Literature 
Alston and Malherbe 2009 TSAR  
 Alston K and Malherbe R "Constitutional Right to Academic Freedom: An 
Exploration into Definition, Scope and Threats" 2009 TSAR 102-123 
Barnard-Naudé and De Vos 2012 LitNet Akademies  
 Barnard-Naudé J and De Vos P "Die Politiek van die Estetiese in 'n Postkoloniale 
Konteks: Menswaardigheid en Vryheid van Uitdrukking in die Debat rondom 
Brett Murray se Skildery The Spear" 2012 LitNet Akademies 176-201 
Bilchitz 2010 SA Public Law  
 Bilchitz D "Does Balancing Adequately Capture the Nature of Rights?" 2010 SA 
Public Law 423-444 
Braun Democracy off Balance 
 Braun S Democracy off Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda 
Law in Canada 2nd rev ed (University of Toronto Press Toronto 2004) 
Brown Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
 Brown L The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 4th ed 
(Clarendon Press Oxford 1993) 
Brugger 2003 German Law Journal 
 Brugger W “The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law” 2003 
German Law Journal  2-44 
Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression 
 Burchell J Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression. The Modern Actio 
Injuriarum (Juta Cape Town 1998) 
Chemerinsky Constitutional Law Principles 
 Chemerinsky E Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 4th ed (Wolters Kluwer 
New York 2011) 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
933 
Cox and Callaghan 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 
 Cox MC and Callaghan EM "To Be or Not to Be, Malice is the Question: An 
Analysis of Nebraska's Fair Report Privilege from a Press Perspective. Annual 
Survey on Issues Affecting Nebraska Law" 2002-2003 Creighton L Rev 21-46 
Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
 Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (Juta Cape Town 
2005) 
Delgado and Stefancic 1996 U Colo L Rev 
 Delgado R and Stefancic J "Apologize and Move On: Finding a Remedy for 
Pornography, Insult, and Hate Speech" 1996 U Colo L Rev 93-111 
Devenish Commentary 
Devenish GE A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (Butterworths 
Durban 1999) 
Ducat Constitutional Interpretation 
 Ducat CR Constitutional Interpretation: Rights of the Individual - Vol II 8th ed 
(Wadsworth/Thomson Learning Belmont CA 2004) 
Dworkin Freedom's Law 
 Dworkin R Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 
(Oxford University Press New York 1996) 
Eberle 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 
 Eberle EJ "Art as Speech" 2007-2008 U Pa J L & Soc Change 11-28  
Farley 2005 Tul L Rev 
 Farley CH "Judging Art" 2005 Tul L Rev 805-858 
Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 
 Hogg PW Constitutional Law of Canada - Vol 2 5th ed (Thomson/Carswell 
Scarborough, Ontario 2007) 
  
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
934 
Keane 2008 Hum Rts Q 
 Keane D "Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression" 2008 Hum Rts Q 845-
875  
Kirkpatrick Bloomsbury Thesaurus 
 Kirkpatrick EM (ed) The Bloomsbury Thesaurus (Bloomsbury London 1997) 
Kok 2001 TSAR 
 Kok A "The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: 
Why the Controversy?" 2001 TSAR 294-310 
Kok 2008 Stell LR 
 Kok A "The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 
of 2000: Court-driven or Legislature-driven Societal Transformation?" 2008 Stell 
LR 122-142 
Kommers and Miller Constitutional Jurisprudence 
 Kommers DP and Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 3rd ed (Duke University Press Durham 2012) 
Krotoszynski 2004 Tul L Rev 
 Krotoszynski RJ "Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free 
Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred 
Constitutional Value in Germany" 2004 Tul L Rev 1549-1609 
Kupenda and Paige 2009 T Marshall L Rev 
 Kupenda AM and Paige TR "Why Punished for Speaking President Obama's 
Name within the Schoolhouse Gates? And Can Educators Constitutionally Truth-
en Marketplace of Ideas about Blacks? Introduction" 2009 T Marshall L Rev 57-
89 
Langton "Beyond Belief" 
Langton R "Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography" in 
Maitra I and McGowan MK (eds) Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free 
Speech (Oxford University Press Oxford 2012) ch 6 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
935 
Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 
 Liebenberg S "The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic 
Rights" 2005 SAJHR 1-31 
Little 2011 S Cal Interdisc L J 
 Little L "Just a Joke: Defamatory Humor and Incongruity's Promise" 2011 S Cal 
Interdisc L J 95-166. 
Marais Constitutionality of Categorical and Conditional Restrictions 
 Marais ME The Constitutionality of Categorical and Conditional Restrictions on 
Harmful Expression Related to Group Identity (LLD thesis University of the Free 
State 2014) 
Meinecke Nazi Ideology and the Holocaust 
 Meinecke WF Nazi Ideology and the Holocaust (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum Washington DC 2007) 
Mill On Liberty 
 Mill JS On Liberty (Forgotten Books London 2013) 
Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech  
 Milo D Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2008) 
Milo, Penfold and Stein "Freedom of Expression" 
 Milo D, Penfold G and Stein A "Freedom of Expression" in Woolman S et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2008) ch 42 
Moon 2008-2009 Fla St U L Rev 
 Moon R "Hate Speech Regulation in Canada" 2008-2009 Fla St U L Rev 79-98 
Neisser 1994 SAJHR 
 Neisser E “Hate Speech in the New South Africa: Constitutional Considerations 
for a Land Recovering from Decades of Racial Repression and Violence” 1994 
SAJHR  336-356 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
936 
Payandeh 2010 German L J 
 Payandeh M "The Limits of Freedom of Expression in the Wunsiedel Decision 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court" 2010 German L J 929-942 
Pillay 2010 SALJ 
 Pillay K "Undo the Cartoon Wars: Free Speech or Hate Speech?" 2010 SALJ 
463-489 
Pretorius 2010 SAJHR  
 Pretorius JL "Fairness in Transformation: A Critique of the Constitutional Court's 
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence" 2010 SAJHR 536-570 
Rautenbach 2001 TSAR  
 Rautenbach IM "Limitation of Rights in Terms of Provisions of the Bill of Rights 
Other Than the General Limitation Clause: A Few Examples" 2001 TSAR 617-
641 
Rautenbach 2007 TSAR  
 Rautenbach IM "Haatspraak en die Reg op Vryheid van Uitdrukking in Suid-
Afrika" 2007 TSAR 551-560 
Robinson and Davidson Chambers 21st Century Dictionary 
 Robinson M and Davidson G (eds) Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (Chambers 
Harrap London 2001) 
Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or 
Publication of Information that Unfairly Discriminates”  
 Roederer “The Prohibition of Hate Speech, Harassment and Dissemination or 
Publication of Information that Unfairly Discriminates” in Albertyn C, Goldblatt 
B and Roederer C (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, Act 4 of 2000 (Witwatersrand University 
Press Johannesburg 2001) ch 7 
  
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
937 
Rosenfeld 2002-2003 Cardozo L Rev 
 Rosenfeld M "Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative 
Analysis" 2002-2003 Cardozo L Rev 1523-1568 
Rosenfeld “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence” 
 Rosenfeld “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Rosenfeld M Herz 
M & Molnar P (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech. Rethinking 
Regulation and Responses.: Cambridge University Press New York 2012) 242-
289 
Roux "Democracy" 
 Roux T "Democracy" in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2008) ch 10 
Salzman 1999 Harv CR-CL L Rev 
 Salzman A "Live Art and the Audience: Toward a Speaker-focused Freedom of 
Expression" 1999 Harv CR-CL L Rev 437-486 
Sealy 1989 Mon LR 
 Sealy LS "Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions" 1989 Mon 
LR 265-278 
Sullivan and Gunther Constitutional Law  
 Sullivan KM and Gunther G Constitutional Law 14th ed (Foundation Press New 
York 2001) 
Tănăsescu 2011 RJCL 
 Tănăsescu S "Artistic Freedom and Its Limitations" 2011 RJCL 25-26  
Teichner 2003 SAJHR  
 Teichner S "The Hate Speech Provisions of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly" 2003 SAJHR 349-381 
  
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
938 
Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 
 Van der Walt JC and Midgley R Principles of Delict (LexisNexis Butterworths 
2005) 
Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism 
 Van Wyk D et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African 
Legal Order (Juta Cape Town 1994) 
Waite et al Concise Oxford Thesaurus 
 Waite M et al (eds) Concise Oxford Thesaurus 2nd ed (Oxford University Press 
New York 2002) 
Weinrib 2009 U Toronto Fac L Rev 
 Weinrib J "What Is the Purpose of Freedom of Expression?" 2009 U Toronto 
Fac L Rev 165-190  
Woolman "Dignity" 
 Woolman S "Dignity" in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2008) ch 35 
Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 
 Woolman S and Botha H "Limitations" in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2008) ch 34 
Wright 2000-2001 Chi-Kent L Rev 
 Wright RG "Traces of Violence: Gadamer, Habermas, and the Hate Speech 
Problem" 2000-2001 Chi-Kent L Rev 991-1014 
Case law 
Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) 
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen's Estate 1994 2 SA 1 (A) 
Auschwitz Lie decision BVerfGE 90 (13 April 1994) 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 
Case v Minister of Safety and Security, Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 3 
SA 617 (CC) 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
939 
De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 
406 (CC) 
Delange v Costa 1989 2 All SA 267 (A) 
Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Merwe 2004 4 All SA 365 (SCA) 
Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) 
Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal and Johncom Investment 2006 ZAGPHC 12 
Jersild v Denmark 15890/89 (1993) (ECHR) 
Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) 
Manamela, Buti v Shapiro GP/2008/1037/E (SAHRC) 2008 
Marais v Jacaranda 94.2 FM 40/A/2012 (BCTSA) 
Mephisto decision BVerfGE 30, 173 (24 February 1971) 
Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 
2007 5 SA 540 (SCA) 
Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973) 
Mohamed v Jassiem 1996 1 SA 673 (A) 
Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2004 3 All SA 511 (SCA) 
Mutzenbacher decision BVerfGE 83, 130, 1 BvR 402/87 (27 November 1990) 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) 
National Media Limited v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 
Print Media South Africa v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 ZAGPJHC 149 
Publications Control Board v Gallo (Africa) Ltd 1975 3 SA 665 (AD) 
R v Ahenakew 2006 SKQB 110 
R v Bahr 2006 ABPC 360 
R v Elms 2006 CanLII 31446 (ON CA) 
R v Noble 2008 BCSC 215 
R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 
R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45 
RAV v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992) 
Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 
S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) 
Sindani v Van Der Merwe 2002 1 All SA 311 (A) 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
940 
Soldiers Are Murderers decision BVerfGE 93, 266-312I (10 October 1995) 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) 
SRC re Bye Bye 08/09-0620/2008 (CBSC) 
Strauss Caricature decision BVerfGE 75, 369 (3 June 1987) 
Street Theater decision BVerfGE 67, 213 1 BvR 816/82 (17 July 1984) 
Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989) 
The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) 
United States v Eichman 496 US 310 (1990) 
Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003) 
Visser, Thomson and Others v 94.7 Highveld Stereo 27/2012 (BCTSA) 
Wunsiedel decision BVerfG 1, BvR 2150/08 (4 November 2009) 
Legislation 
Canada 
Criminal Code (RsC, 1985, c C-46) 
Germany 
German Basic Law 
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
International instruments 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) 
ICCPR General Comment 34 - Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (2011) 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
  
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
941 
Internet sources 
BCCSA 2009 and 2011 http://www.bccsa.co.za/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=915 
 Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa 2009 and 2011 Codes of 
Conduct for Free to Air and Subscription Broadcasting Service Licensees 
http://www.bccsa.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91
5 accessed 8 November 2014 
Bronstein 2006 http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_ 
document.pdf 
 Bronstein V 2006 What You Can and Can't Say in South Africa 
http://da.wwc.co.za/docs/548/Censorshipvictoriabronsstein_document.pdf 
accessed 7 November 2014 
Isenson 2006 http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1891671_page_0,00.html 
 Isenson N 2006 Cartoon Controversy Reflects Deeper Problems in Denmark 
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1891671_page_0,00.html accessed 8 
November 2014 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ANC African National Congress 
BCCSA Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa 
BCTSA Broadcasting Complaints Tribunal of South Africa 
Cardozo L Rev Cardozo Law Review 
CBSC Canadian Broadcast Standards Council 
Chi-Kent L Rev Chicago-Kent Law Review 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Creighton L Rev Creighton Law Review 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
Fla St U L Rev Florida State University Law Review 
German L J German Law Journal 
Harv CR-CL L Rev Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 
M MARAIS & J PRETORIUS   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
942 
Hum Rts Q Human Rights Quarterly 
ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
Mon LR Monash University Law Review 
RJCL Romanian Journal of Comparative Law 
S Cal Interdisc L J Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 
SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission 
SAJHR South African Journal on Human Rights 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
T Marshall L Rev Thurgood Marshall Law Review 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg / Journal of South 
African Law 
Tul L Rev Tulane Law Review 
U Colo L Rev University of Colorado Law Review 
U Pa J L & Soc Change University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social 
Change 
U Toronto Fac L Rev University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Committee 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
